Illegally Evading Attribution? Russia\u27s Use of Unmarked Troops in Crimea and International Humanitarian Law

The Crimean Crisis of February and March 2014 poses several questions to International Law. This Article explores one of them: Does the use of unmarked troops, soldiers in uniforms but without nationality insignia, in Crimea violate principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)? This Article first provides a brief summary of Crimea\u27s history and the facts of the 2014 Crimean Crisis. It will be argued that IHL is applicable to the events in Crimea in February and March 2014 since the unmarked soldiers are attributable to Russia--either as Russian nationals or through Russia\u27s exercise of control over them--and that there was no valid consent given justifying an intervention by invitation. The Article will argue that the principle of distinction under IHL is not violated since it requires only that combatants should be distinguishable from the civilian population but does not require a link between the combatant and a particular party to the conflict. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that IHL regarding military uniforms leaves states a broad area of discretion as to the appearance of a military uniform and does not oblige combatants to visibly disclose their nationality by wearing emblems or insignia. This Article will also argue that the use of unmarked soldiers in the case at hand does not amount to illegal perfidy under IHL but--absent clear legal provisions and noticeable examples from state practice--must be regarded as a lawful ruse of war. Lastly, the final Part will consider whether it is wise to amend the current legal rules in order to prohibit the use of unmarked soldiers in similar situations arising in future armed conflicts and will spell out a recommendation

Between Light and Shadow: The International Law Against Genocide in the International Court of Justice’s Judgement in Croatia v. Serbia (2015)

This Article identifies and critically analyzes the contributions the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made to the international law against genocide via the judgment in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) of February 3, 2015. This Article elaborates on the concept of genocide—a term that has originally been coined after the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust—and the protection against this “crime of crimes” under international law. The analysis section of this Article refers to the historical and procedural context of the dispute between Croatia and Serbia in the case, which originates from the violent conflict between the two states following the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The main section of this Article criticizes the most important aspects of the ICJ’s judgment, especially the Court’s assessment of the constituent elements of genocide, the objective and the subjective components, while also taking into account the ICJ’s prior judgment in the Bosnian Genocide Case of 2007. The Article concludes that the ICJ’s reasoning is in line with its prior judgment. However, the Article criticizes that the Court has missed opportunities to clarify on questions of jurisdiction and of its relationship with International Criminal Tribunals. It also failed to shed light on the interpretation of the crime of genocide as an international wrongful act of states with respect to many important and highly controversial issues, thus missing the opportunity to establish clearer guidelines for many disputed aspects in the determination of genocide in future disputes